Health Minister Resigns Amid New Controversy
Tirana Times, September 02, 2026 - The resignation of Health and Social Welfare Minister Evis Sala after less than a year in office has opened a new political controversy, with the opposition alleging that her departure followed a dispute over government plans to restructure the health sector. Sala announced Wednesday that she was leaving Prime Minister Edi Rama's government after accepting what she described as important international commitments in oncology, artificial intelligence and innovation. "Today was my last meeting as a member of the government Cabinet," Sala said in a video message. She thanked Rama for his trust and support and said her commitment to Albania would continue despite leaving office. "Positions have a beginning and an end. But responsibility and the connection with your country have no limits," Sala said. Almost immediately, Democratic Party lawmaker Belind Këlliçi offered a different explanation. A 'parallel Health Ministry' Këlliçi claimed Sala resigned after refusing to sign draft legislation that would create a new structure with extensive powers over Albania's health system. "Evis Sala left to open the way for handing health care over to Rama's Israeli friend," Këlliçi wrote, referring to businessman Sani Sanilevich, whom he described as a close associate of the prime minister. According to Këlliçi, the new entity would control medicines, medical equipment, procurement, storage and distribution, functioning in practice as a "parallel Ministry of Health." "The draft law, which is currently being prepared and is expected to pass when the parliamentary session begins, opens the way for a major business operation involving medicines, medical equipment and every logistical and strategic operation," Këlliçi said. He claimed Sala opposed the project and refused to sign it. Neither Sala nor Rama has confirmed that such a dispute was behind the resignation, and Këlliçi's allegations have not been independently proven. Still, the claims have shifted attention from Sala's official explanation toward the government's plans for reorganizing health sector management. Questions over Sanilevich Këlliçi placed Sani Sanilevich at the center of his accusations. He described him as an Israeli Albanian businessman close to Rama and noted that he serves as an honorary consul of Albania and is a founder and shareholder of Jet Bank, the country's first digital bank. Këlliçi alleged that Sanilevich and his business partners have expanding interests in Albania and are now targeting the health sector. According to the opposition lawmaker, those interests could extend beyond a private hospital to medicines, equipment and health sector logistics. No evidence has been publicly presented showing that Sanilevich would control the proposed entity or that interests connected to him caused Sala's resignation. But the allegations raise questions about who could benefit from the restructuring and how much authority the new structure would receive. Këlliçi called on Albania's Special Prosecution Against Corruption and Organized Crime, SPAK, to examine the project, describing it as potentially more serious than the controversial sterilization and health check concessions. From academia to politics Sala's departure is also significant because of her professional background. A prominent academic and internationally recognized medical specialist, she joined Rama's government a year ago after a long career in medicine, oncology and academic research. Her appointment was presented as a technocratic choice and an example of Rama's efforts to bring internationally experienced Albanian professionals into government. In her departure message, Sala said important reforms had begun during her tenure, citing oncology, modernization of medical services, artificial intelligence and innovation. Her statement made no reference to disagreements with Rama, procurement disputes or the proposed new health structure. Corruption in the background The controversy comes against the broader record of Albania's health sector, which for years has faced allegations involving public procurement, concessions, pharmaceutical contracts and private business interests. The sterilization and health check concessions have been among the most controversial health projects under Rama's governments and have also been subject to criminal investigations. During Sala's time in office, accusations and concerns over procurement continued, although there has been no judicial finding of wrongdoing by Sala herself. That distinction is important. The controversy is not about a proven corruption case involving the outgoing minister. It centers instead on the claim that she resisted a new institutional arrangement that critics say could concentrate major financial and administrative powers in one entity. If that claim is true, her resignation would have implications far beyond a routine Cabinet change. If it is not, the government still faces questions about what the proposed structure will do, who will control it and how conflicts of interest will be prevented. A resignation with wider implications For Rama, Sala's departure is politically uncomfortable. It also raises broader questions about the role of technocratic appointments in a system where politics, public procurement and powerful business interests often intersect. The central questions now go beyond Sala herself. Will the new entity be created? Will it control medicines, medical equipment and procurement? Who will run it, and what role, if any, will private business interests play? When Sala entered government, she said in a television interview that "adrenaline" was one of the reasons she had accepted the position of health minister. Less than a year later, she has resigned. The adrenaline may have ended for Sala, but the political controversy surrounding Albania's health system is only beginning. The post Health Minister Resigns Amid New Controversy appeared first on Tirana Times .

Albania Turns Away Tanker Linked to Russia's Shadow Fleet

Durres decision puts sanctions enforcement under scrutiny after vessel had previously called at Albanian port.

Tirana Times, September 01, 2026 – Albania's decision to deny entry to a tanker identified by Ukrainian military intelligence as part of Russia's so-called shadow fleet marks more than an isolated maritime enforcement action. It is also a test of how effectively the country is translating its political alignment with Western sanctions against Moscow into practice. Albanian port authorities prevented the Sierra Leone-flagged tanker Hanuman from entering the Port of Durres after the vessel was identified by Ukraine's military intelligence agency, known as GUR, and partner services as being connected to the network of ships used to transport Russian oil and petroleum products. Taulant Allkja, captain of the Port of Durres, told BIRN that the ship, carrying IMO number 9295048, was notified of the decision while about 12 miles from the Albanian coast and was not permitted to enter the port's anchorage. "The ship received the notification from the Port Authority at a distance of 12 miles from Durres and is now continuing its voyage in the Adriatic Sea," Allkja told BIRN. The episode is significant because Albania, a NATO member and European Union candidate country, has consistently aligned itself politically with EU sanctions imposed on Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. But declaring alignment with sanctions and enforcing them across ports, financial institutions, companies and commercial networks are different challenges. The Hanuman case illustrates that distinction. According to data published by GUR and updated June 10, the tanker has been involved in transporting Russian petroleum products to third countries during the period in which the G7 and the European Union have imposed restrictions on Russian seaborne oil exports. Ukrainian intelligence says that in September 2025 the vessel transported more than 30,000 metric tons of Russian petroleum products from Novorossiysk to Turkey. It has also called at the Sheskharis terminal in Novorossiysk, a major Russian oil export facility connected with Chernomortransneft, a subsidiary of the Russian state pipeline operator Transneft. The wider problem for Western governments is the increasingly complicated maritime system Russia has developed to keep its oil exports moving despite sanctions. The so-called shadow fleet generally consists of tankers operating through companies, owners, managers and flag registrations that can be difficult to trace. Ships may change flags or ownership structures and operate outside many of the traditional Western insurance and shipping networks. That complexity makes enforcement particularly difficult for smaller countries such as Albania, which depend heavily on information supplied by international partners and intelligence agencies to identify potentially problematic ships before they enter territorial waters or ports. The Durres decision therefore represents an important shift from political commitment to operational enforcement. It is also notable because Hanuman had previously visited Durres, according to maritime traffic data cited by BIRN. The tanker called at the Albanian port in November 2025. That previous visit raises the central question surrounding the latest episode: whether Albania's sanctions enforcement system has now become more capable of identifying ships linked to Russia's efforts to circumvent Western restrictions, or whether vessels connected with those networks had previously been able to use Albanian ports without sufficient scrutiny. A BIRN investigation published in May raised similar concerns. It identified vessels suspected of involvement in transporting Russian oil or grain originating from Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories that had visited Albanian ports since 2022. The investigation raised questions about the practical enforcement of the sanctions Albania had formally adopted against Moscow. The decision to turn Hanuman away therefore carries political significance beyond the tanker itself. For Tirana, enforcing sanctions is part of a broader foreign policy identity built around close alignment with the United States, NATO and the European Union. Albania has been among the countries seeking to demonstrate a clear strategic position since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. That alignment is particularly important as Albania continues negotiations for EU membership. Foreign policy alignment with Brussels is one measure of a candidate country's willingness and ability to implement European decisions, but implementation increasingly matters as much as political declarations. Russia's shadow fleet has become a major focus of Western sanctions policy precisely because Moscow's ability to continue exporting oil weakens one of the central objectives of those sanctions: reducing the revenues available to finance the war in Ukraine. The G7 and European Union introduced a price cap system in late 2022 alongside restrictions on shipping services, insurance and financing for Russian oil transported above specified price levels. Russia responded in part by expanding its reliance on ships and commercial structures outside the traditional Western-controlled maritime system. For Albania, the Hanuman episode demonstrates how that global confrontation can arrive quite literally at its ports. There is also an important distinction. Identification by Ukrainian intelligence as part of the shadow fleet should not automatically be treated as proof that a vessel is individually listed under every EU or international sanctions regime, nor does the Durres incident by itself establish what cargo the ship was carrying when it approached Albania. But port authorities do not have to view such intelligence as irrelevant. The broader pattern of a vessel's activities, previous Russian port calls and information shared by partner intelligence services can create sufficient compliance and security concerns for authorities to refuse access. That appears to be what happened in Durres. The importance of the case will therefore depend less on the fate of one tanker than on whether the decision signals a systematic approach. If Albania begins consistently screening vessels, ownership structures, previous port calls and possible connections to sanctions circumvention, the refusal of Hanuman could represent a meaningful tightening of enforcement. If it remains an isolated action, the questions raised by earlier visits of suspicious vessels to Albanian ports will remain. For a NATO ally and aspiring EU member, that distinction matters. Sanctions are ultimately effective not when governments endorse them in statements, but when ships, companies and financial networks attempting to circumvent them discover that ports such as Durres are no longer available to them. Criminal Money Casts Shadow Over Albania's Tourism Boom Killing of Portuguese tourist raises broader questions about criminal capital, weak oversight and the future of Albania's fast-growing coastal tourism industry TIRANA, Albania - The killing of a 20-year-old Portuguese tourist at a luxury beach club in southern Albania has turned attention beyond a single violent crime to a more uncomfortable question confronting the country's rapidly expanding tourism industry: Who is financing Albania's coastal boom, and how closely are those investments being scrutinized? Luis Miguel Varela Mendes was fatally stabbed in the early hours of Aug. 18 following a confrontation at Tortuga Bay, also known as Principotes, a luxury tourist complex in Ksamil, one of Albania's busiest summer destinations. The killing shocked a resort town that has become a symbol of Albania's emergence as a major Mediterranean tourism destination. But details that emerged afterward have raised broader concerns about the ownership and management of tourism businesses, the employment of public security officials by private operators and the possible penetration of illicit money into one of the country's fastest-growing economic sectors. According to business registry records cited by BIRN, the Ksamil complex is owned by 76-year-old Kade Bulica, the mother of Bekim Bulica, 36, who was declared wanted after the killing on suspicion of failing to report a crime. Police officials told BIRN that Bekim Bulica had previously faced criminal proceedings involving violence and had other problems with the law. Questions intensified after authorities established that security at the tourist complex included an officer from the Gjirokastra Border Police, an employee of the Fier prison police and a Gjirokastra municipal police officer, along with a fourth person working as a bodyguard. Police said the four were present when the confrontation that ended in Mendes' death occurred but neither intervened nor notified authorities. They were detained on accusations that included failure to report a crime and failure to take measures to prevent unlawful activity. For security and tourism experts, those circumstances make the Ksamil case more than an isolated test of policing. They expose weaknesses in Albania's ability to oversee the people, businesses and money behind an unprecedented construction and tourism expansion along the Adriatic and Ionian coasts. From Velipoja in the north to Ksamil in the south, Albania's coastline has been transformed by hotels, apartment complexes, restaurants, beach clubs and large resorts. The boom has helped place the country firmly on Europe's tourism map, but experts warn that rapid development has also created opportunities for money of questionable origin to enter the formal economy. Former prosecutor Eugen Beçi says tourism and construction are particularly attractive sectors for laundering proceeds from criminal activity because of their heavy use of cash, large seasonal turnover and the relative ease with which revenues can be inflated or fictitious transactions recorded. Building hotels and resorts, Beçi said, can allow illicit cash to move into the legal economic cycle and ultimately be converted into high-value real estate. The problem is not merely theoretical. According to figures cited from Albania's Special Prosecution Against Corruption and Organized Crime, or SPAK, authorities imposed preventive seizures during the first seven months of 2026 on assets valued at 440 million euros that were suspected of having been financed through illegal activity, particularly international drug trafficking. Hotels, many of them located along Albania's coast, account for a significant part of assets seized from organized crime figures and people linked to them. That pattern points to a potential structural vulnerability in Albania's tourism model. An industry experiencing rapid growth and requiring enormous amounts of investment can offer legitimate entrepreneurs significant opportunities. But the same characteristics can make it attractive to criminal organizations seeking to convert cash into apparently legitimate assets. The risks extend beyond money laundering. Beçi warns that tourist properties controlled by people linked to organized crime can become logistical bases where weapons are stored, fugitives are sheltered or conflicts between rival groups are transferred into public spaces frequented by tourists. Redion Qirjazi, executive director of the Mary Ward Loreto Foundation, which works against human trafficking, said reports and SPAK investigations suggest some large tourism businesses have operated not simply as commercial enterprises but as territories under the influence of structured criminal groups. The presence of serving police or prison officers working as private security creates another layer of concern. Qirjazi argues that such employment can compromise the professional independence of public officials and create an obvious conflict when an officer is expected to enforce the law against the same private business that provides additional income. The Ksamil case therefore raises questions not only about criminal groups but about the state institutions responsible for supervising them. Experts interviewed by BIRN argue that Albania already has many of the legal and institutional mechanisms needed to investigate the origins of investment capital. The central question is whether those mechanisms are being applied consistently and early enough. They have called for greater cooperation among the Tourism Ministry, State Police, SPAK, tax authorities and the agency responsible for preventing money laundering. They also advocate more detailed checks on beneficial ownership and the financial background of investors before licenses are issued for major hotels, resorts or beach operations. Beçi argues that financial investigations should not begin only after shootings, arrests or other serious criminal incidents. They should run proactively alongside major investment projects when an investor's financial profile appears inconsistent with declared legitimate income. That approach would represent a significant shift from reacting to criminal cases toward preventing illicit capital from becoming embedded in the economy. Tourism industry representatives also see economic consequences. Eva Rama, head of the Albanian Tour Operators Association, cautions against portraying the entire tourism industry as unsafe because of individual crimes. But she says businesses controlled by people linked to criminal activity can damage the credibility of the sector and distort competition. Legitimate operators investing declared and lawfully earned capital cannot compete on equal terms with businesses able to draw on proceeds from crime. That creates a problem extending well beyond policing. It affects prices, investment, competition and ultimately confidence in Albania as a tourism market. Tourism management consultant Rezart Shehu similarly describes the Mendes killing as an isolated event rather than evidence that Albania as a whole is an unsafe destination. Serious crimes, he notes, also occur in established tourism destinations elsewhere in Europe. But he places responsibility on state institutions to identify suspicious sources of wealth and prevent tourism businesses from becoming channels through which illicit capital can be invested and laundered. That distinction is important for Albania. The country's tourism expansion has been one of its most visible economic transformations in recent years. New hotels, resorts and restaurants have changed entire stretches of coastline and brought international visitors to destinations that were largely unknown outside the region only a short time ago. The danger is not that one killing will reverse that growth. The larger risk is that repeated cases involving criminal figures, unexplained capital or compromised state officials could gradually undermine the reputation on which a tourism economy depends. Tourism is unusually sensitive to perceptions of safety and trust. It is also dependent on investors believing that competitors operate under the same rules. The death of a young Portuguese tourist in Ksamil has therefore become a test extending far beyond the investigation into his killing. It is a test of whether Albania can ensure that the extraordinary physical transformation of its coastline is matched by equally strong institutions capable of determining who owns the new tourism economy, where the money financing it comes from and whether the law applies equally to those operating behind its most exclusive gates. The post Albania Turns Away Tanker Linked to Russia's Shadow Fleet appeared first on Tirana Times .

Mladić's Death Exposes the Balkans' Unfinished Reckoning With War Crimes

Thousands honor the convicted Bosnian Serb commander as reactions from Belgrade to Podgorica and Skopje reveal how deeply the wars of the 1990s still shape the region's European future .

Tirana Times, August 31, 2026 – PALE, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Candles burned and flares lit the Olympic Park as several thousand people gathered to honor Ratko Mladić, chanting his name and singing songs portraying the convicted Bosnian Serb military commander as a hero. A day earlier, hundreds had gathered in Istočno Novo Sarajevo, in the Serb-run Republika Srpska entity, where a memorial was held and a banner displayed in Mladić's honor. The gatherings, which should not be confused with central Sarajevo, drew hundreds in Istočno Novo Sarajevo and several thousand in Pale. The images were striking: More than three decades after the Bosnian war ended, large crowds were paying tribute to a man who died while serving a life sentence for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Mladić commanded the Bosnian Serb army during the 1992-95 war. He was convicted for the Srebrenica genocide, where more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys were killed, and for crimes including the campaign of terror against civilians during the siege of Sarajevo. His life sentence was upheld on appeal. His death on Aug. 27 has exposed how far parts of the Western Balkans remain from a common understanding of the wars of the 1990s - and how the refusal to confront that past increasingly collides with the region's declared ambition to join the European Union. The sharpest illustration came from Belgrade. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić criticized the U.N. war crimes court for refusing to allow the seriously ill Mladić to return to Serbia and said the state would help organize a dignified burial if his family decided he should be buried there. Justice Minister Nenad Vujić went further, saying Mladić would be buried with the "highest state and military honors." Those statements move the issue beyond private mourning. Senior Serbian officials are signaling that a man convicted of genocide can still receive the symbolism normally reserved for national service and honor. Serbia ultimately cooperated with international justice, and Mladić was arrested there in 2011 after more than 15 years as a fugitive. But judicial cooperation has never fully developed into a political and social reckoning with the crimes established in court. For significant parts of Serbia's political establishment, Mladić is still viewed primarily through the prism of Serbian suffering and national defense rather than through the crimes for which he was convicted. That view is not shared by all Serbs or all Serbian parties. The Green-Left Front said Mladić's death did not end responsibility for war crimes and warned against glorifying a convicted war criminal. The Democratic Party said death could not change facts established by international courts or erase responsibility. Other opposition groups took similar positions, while the nationalist New DSS praised Mladić as a defender of the Serbian people. Yet the message from senior state officials remains especially significant because similar language has been echoed across the Drina River in Republika Srpska. Bosnia-Herzegovina effectively spoke with two voices after Mladić's death. Denis Bećirović, chair of the country's three-member presidency, said Mladić would remain written "in black letters" in the history of Bosnia, Europe and the world and that court judgments and facts would survive him. Federation Prime Minister Nermin Nikšić said Mladić's death did not alter the truth or diminish responsibility established by international courts, recalling the thousands killed, expelled and imprisoned, the Srebrenica genocide and years of terror against Sarajevo's civilian population. The Serbian member of Bosnia's presidency, Željka Cvijanović, reacted in almost opposite terms. She said she received news of his death with "sincere sadness" and said Serbs would remember him as commander of the "glorious" Republika Srpska Army that defended their people. Staša Košarac, deputy chair of Bosnia's Council of Ministers, called Mladić a "patriot" and said he "was, is and will remain my commander." Other senior Republika Srpska leaders also praised his wartime role. The ceremonies in Pale and East Sarajevo were therefore not isolated expressions of grief. They reflected a political narrative deeply embedded in Republika Srpska's institutions and public life. Three decades after the Dayton peace agreement ended the war, Bosnia's senior officials still cannot agree on the historical and moral meaning of one of its central wartime figures, even when international courts have established the legal facts. The controversy has also reached Montenegro, where it intersects directly with the country's EU membership bid. Parliament Speaker Andrija Mandić announced that he had sent condolences to Mladić's son Darko, personally and on behalf of his New Serbian Democracy party. His political ally Milan Knežević published a photograph of Mladić with the message: "Every Serbian house has a Ratko." Mandić is not a marginal nationalist figure. He presides over the parliament of a country negotiating membership in the European Union. Montenegro's president and government quickly distanced themselves. President Jakov Milatović's office said Mladić's convictions for genocide and serious war crimes were legally established facts and that sympathy toward his family could not justify relativizing those crimes. Foreign Minister Ervin Ibrahimović said a finally convicted war criminal, "alive or dead," deserved only contempt. Prime Minister Milojko Spajić's Europe Now Movement said Mandić's condolences represented his and his party's position, not government policy, and said there could be no relativization of final judgments for genocide and war crimes. But the case raises a broader question: Can a country credibly embrace European values while one of its highest-ranking officials honors a convicted war criminal? Croatia, an EU member and Montenegro's neighbor, said Mandić's condolences were unacceptable and contrary to European values. Zagreb also reminded Podgorica that bilateral disputes and political choices remain relevant to Montenegro's progress toward membership. A much sharper personal judgment came from retired Croatian General Rahim Ademi, who fought forces under Mladić's command during the war in Croatia. "I can say that he was not a soldier at all," Ademi said in comments circulated by Daily Croatia after Mladić's death. "He never showed his military skills in warfare, he showed 'courage' only on innocent civilians, killing civilians and people who were unarmed." The post said that in September 1991, Ademi and his units defeated Serbian forces under Mladić's command near Šibenik. Ademi's remarks underscore how sharply Mladić's legacy differs across the former Yugoslavia. Where some Serbian nationalists celebrate him as a formidable commander, Ademi described a military record defined by violence against civilians rather than battlefield skill. The contradiction is particularly relevant for Montenegro. The country can close negotiating chapters and align legislation with Brussels, but EU integration is not only a technical exercise. The European project also rests on the rejection of ethnic warfare, genocide and the glorification of those convicted of such crimes. Honoring Mladić as a hero and claiming adherence to those values are increasingly difficult positions to reconcile. North Macedonia has faced a similar test. Dalibor Kitanović, director of the state Agency for the Realization of Community Rights, caused an uproar after glorifying Mladić publicly. At the same time, the Democratic Party of Serbs, led by Local Self-Government Minister Ivan Stoilković, published a tribute describing Mladić as a soldier and general who had placed his life at the service of his people. The government responded that Mladić had been finally convicted of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and called Kitanović's position "personal and unacceptable." It said he should withdraw it or, if unable to accept government policy, leave his post. The governing Albanian coalition VLEN condemned the glorification, while the opposition DUI and Social Democrats demanded political accountability. The episode showed how unresolved interpretations of the Yugoslav wars continue to reach into contemporary governing coalitions. In Kosovo, reactions focused primarily on Serbia. Acting minister Andin Hoti said that in 2026 there was still a European state that had not completed the process of confronting its past and where war criminals continued to be glorified. He questioned how that could be reconciled with Serbia's EU candidacy. Vjosa Osmani similarly argued that Serbia's reaction showed its political establishment had not fundamentally changed, while criticizing Brussels for continuing to support a candidate country that glorifies war criminals and denies genocide and other wartime crimes. The European Commission has drawn the clearest line. It said any glorification of war criminals runs counter to the most fundamental European values and has no place either in the European Union or among candidate countries. That warning applies not only to Serbia but also to the contradictions exposed in Montenegro and North Macedonia. Albert Rakipi, chairman of the Albanian Institute for International Studies, AIIS, and a former deputy foreign minister of Albania, said the reactions to Mladić's death represented a deeply troubling development for Balkan societies, particularly for countries seeking membership in the European Union. "It is profoundly disappointing that, more than three decades after the wars, significant parts of Balkan societies are still not ready to break with the criminal legacy of the wars of the 1990s," Rakipi said. "For countries that aspire to join the European Union, this is especially critical. European integration cannot be reduced to negotiating chapters and adopting legislation. It also requires a clear political and moral break with the glorification of war crimes and those convicted of committing them." European Parliament rapporteur for Serbia Tonino Picula said participation by Serbian government representatives in Mladić's funeral would reveal the degree to which authorities in Belgrade identify with his crimes and called for an appropriate EU response. The question is whether Brussels will treat the latest glorification merely as offensive rhetoric or as a political test with consequences for enlargement. The wars ended more than three decades ago, but the battle over their meaning did not. Mladić's death has shown that the issue is no longer simply whether governments cooperate with international courts or formally recognize their judgments. The deeper test is whether political elites accept what those judgments mean when the perpetrators belong to their own national community. Many Serbian politicians, officials and citizens in Serbia and elsewhere have clearly rejected the glorification of war criminals. The issue should therefore not be presented as if an entire nation refuses to confront its past. But the institutional weight of the reactions since Mladić's death is difficult to ignore. A Serbian justice minister promises the highest state and military honors. Montenegro's parliament speaker sends condolences. A minister's party in North Macedonia publishes a tribute. Senior Bosnian Serb officials continue to portray Mladić as an honorable commander. Thousands gather in Pale to chant his name. These are not memories confined to history books. They show that the politics of the 1990s still reaches into governments, parliaments and governing coalitions across the Western Balkans. Ratko Mladić is dead. The political mythology built around him is not. And as long as convicted war criminals can be celebrated by officials who simultaneously speak of a European future, confronting the past will remain not only a question of history and reconciliation, but a test of what European integration in the Balkans actually means. The post Mladić's Death Exposes the Balkans' Unfinished Reckoning With War Crimes appeared first on Tirana Times .

Albania's Cash Boom Raises Money Laundering Concerns

Cash outside Albania's banking system reached a record 5.6 billion euros, last month .

Tirana Times, August 30, 2026 – The amount of cash circulating outside Albania's banking system has reached a record high, raising fresh concerns over the scale of the informal economy, the possible presence of illicit money and the effectiveness of government efforts to move financial transactions into formal channels. Cash held outside banks rose to more than 522 billion lek, or approximately 5.6 billion euros, last month, according to figures reported by Albanian media. It is the highest level ever recorded and represents an increase of around 71 billion lek compared with July last year. The figure is particularly striking when compared with the overall amount of money circulating in the Albanian economy, estimated at around 2.1 trillion lek. Cash outside the banking system now accounts for roughly 25 percent of that total. While cash held outside banks cannot automatically be classified as informal or illegal money, economists argue that the unusually high level raises important questions about the size of Albania's cash based economy and the sources of some of the funds circulating beyond the banking system. Economic expert Zef Preçi told A2CNN that the phenomenon cannot be separated from Albania's persistent problems with informality and criminal proceeds. "Money circulating outside the banking system is part of the informal economy, and together with it there is also money originating from criminal activities conducted inside or outside our country," Preçi said. The scale of the phenomenon appears even more significant when compared with European Union countries, where, according to the figures cited in the report, cash outside the banking system does not exceed around 9 percent of the overall money supply. For Albania, therefore, the record level of cash is not merely a question of payment habits. It points to a broader structural problem, with a significant part of economic activity continuing to take place beyond the full visibility of banks and public institutions. Preçi argues that both weaknesses in public administration and the circulation of money generated through illegal activities have contributed to the situation. "Partly because of the inability of the administration and partly by allowing the entry of money from criminal activities, we have reached such a high level of money outside the banking system," he said. "Although the Fiscal Amnesty was not allowed to be adopted as law, in practice it has happened." The reference to the proposed fiscal amnesty is politically significant. The initiative generated controversy because of concerns that mechanisms designed to legalize undeclared wealth could potentially provide opportunities for money of unclear origin to enter the formal economy. The latest figures suggest that, regardless of the fate of that initiative, Albania continues to face a substantial accumulation and circulation of cash outside banks. The trend also feeds into another long running debate in the Albanian economy, the unusual strength of the lek and the continued depreciation of the euro and other foreign currencies. Some economists believe that large volumes of informal cash entering and circulating in the economy are among the factors placing downward pressure on foreign currencies. Preçi said he shares the assessment of international institutions that informal money may have an effect on exchange rate developments, while stressing that commercial banks alone cannot be expected to address the problem. "I agree with the international institutions that it may have a certain effect, but we can in no way pretend that informal money can be fought by commercial banks," he said. The government has already attempted to reduce the use of physical cash. Since January 1, cash payments have been subject to a ceiling, with individuals allowed to make transactions in cash of up to 500,000 lek. So far, however, the restriction appears to have done little to reverse the broader trend. Instead of declining, the amount of cash outside the banking system has continued to expand and has now reached an unprecedented level. That creates a policy dilemma for Albania. Restricting cash transactions may encourage greater use of banks, but administrative limits alone cannot address the reasons why individuals and businesses choose to remain outside formal financial channels. Nor can they determine the origin of billions of euros circulating in cash. The record 522 billion lek therefore represents more than an unusual monetary statistic. It has become another indicator of one of Albania's most persistent economic challenges, the gap between the formal economy visible to institutions and a large cash economy operating outside the banking system. For a country seeking deeper economic integration with the European Union, reducing that gap will increasingly be not only a fiscal issue, but also a question of financial transparency, institutional credibility and the rule of law. The post Albania's Cash Boom Raises Money Laundering Concerns appeared first on Tirana Times .

Montenegro Points to Albania and Serbia in Hybrid Threat Claim
Tirana Times, August 28, 2026 – An extraordinary political and diplomatic controversy has emerged between Montenegro and Albania after Montenegrin media reported that Prime Minister Milojko Spajić was referring to Albania and Serbia when he warned of a coordinated hybrid operation aimed at destabilizing Montenegro and obstructing its progress toward European Union membership. The allegation is potentially serious, but an important distinction remains. Spajić himself has not publicly named either Albania or Serbia. He said that Montenegrin authorities had obtained serious operational security information indicating that the expected closure of new negotiating chapters with Brussels would be accompanied by coordinated hybrid activities involving officials from at least two countries in the region. According to Spajić, the activities are intended to destabilize Montenegro with support from certain political actors and part of the domestic media scene. "According to our information, such activities are aimed at destabilizing Montenegro, with the expected support of certain political actors and part of the media scene in our country. We know these intentions and we are aware of their purpose. Attempts at destabilization will neither change our course nor stop Montenegro's European path, which is greater than the daily interests of any political structure," Spajić said. It was the influential Montenegrin daily Vijesti, citing several sources, that subsequently reported that the two countries Spajić had in mind were Serbia and Albania. That distinction is crucial. As of now, there has been no formal public accusation by the Montenegrin government against Albania. What exists is a serious warning by the prime minister about two unnamed regional states and media reporting that identifies those states as Serbia and Albania. The controversy has nevertheless become important enough for President Jakov Milatović to call an extraordinary meeting of Montenegro's Defence and Security Council for August 31. He has requested detailed information from security officials about the alleged coordinated hybrid activity and an assessment of the country's security situation. Milatović described Spajić's claims as "very, very serious" and insisted that they be verified institutionally. "Yesterday, the Prime Minister made serious accusations against political actors in Montenegro, accusations related to the destabilization of Montenegro. I think this certainly needs to be verified institutionally," Milatović said. He also demanded clarity about possible domestic involvement. "I think the public needs to know who we are talking about. Who, I assume, are the ministers, even government secretaries, who are destabilizing Montenegro from within, who are connected to criminal structures and services," he said. The Albanian government responded cautiously, avoiding escalation while firmly rejecting any suggestion that Albania could be involved in destabilizing Montenegro. Foreign Minister Ferit Hoxha stressed that no official accusation against Albania had been made and drew a clear distinction between Spajić's statement and subsequent media interpretations. "I have seen the statement by the Prime Minister of Montenegro, Milojko Spajić, regarding the alleged involvement of officials from 'at least two countries in the region' in coordinated hybrid activities. I have also seen the various media interpretations and insinuations that followed. Media reports are part of public debate. We read and analyse them with due attention, but we treat them with the necessary reservation, especially when they contain different or contradictory interpretations." "Although no accusation has been officially formulated against Albania, I want to state strongly and clearly that Albania is not and cannot be part of any destabilizing scenario, neither in Montenegro, a neighbouring, friendly country, partner and NATO ally, with which we share the same project of membership in the European Union, nor anywhere else. Albania distinguishes itself precisely by doing the opposite: investing every day in cooperation, mutual understanding, stability and regional development, as well as in broader European and Atlantic cooperation." Hoxha continued: "Media speculation, interpretations or domestic political debates in a neighbouring country cannot and should not artificially create problems between our two countries. We are in continuous contact at all levels, and this is how I have acted in this case as well, in the communications I have had with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ibrahimović, as well as with Deputy Prime Minister Nik Gjeloshaj. Different actors, including political ones, are welcome to obtain from the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs any information necessary to avoid unnecessary debates and, above all, to prevent the country's foreign policy from becoming the object or instrument of domestic party debates and approaches. Foreign policy always requires calm, maturity and responsibility." The response from Tirana is notably measured. Given that Podgorica has not officially accused Albania, the matter could arguably have remained within diplomatic channels while the Albanian government sought clarification. Hoxha's statement itself confirms that such contacts with senior Montenegrin officials are already taking place. Albert Rakipi, a former Albanian deputy foreign minister and currently Chairman of the Albanian Institute for International Studies, AIIS, says any accusation against Albania would be both unexpected and difficult to reconcile with the history and interests of the two countries. "To raise accusations against Albania seems very unexpected and misplaced. Albania and Montenegro have always had good relations. Albania has no interest whatsoever in undermining Montenegro's future. Such a claim is absurd. Nevertheless, we should wait for explanations from the Montenegrin government," Rakipi told Tirana Times. Rakipi argues that Albania cannot reasonably be placed in the same category as Serbia or other external actors that have sought to shape Montenegro's internal political agenda. "The efforts of third powers to influence Montenegro's agenda are clear. There is not only the use of proxy actors by Russia. Serbia itself has its own agenda in Montenegro, based on its interests and on a policy that, if not revisionist, is at least aimed at maintaining influence and a degree of control through institutions in Montenegro. Albania has no comparable interest," Rakipi said. The distinction is particularly important because Montenegro has long faced pressure generated by competing geopolitical, national and identity based agendas. Serbian political influence, Russian interests and actors linked to Republika Srpska form part of a broader regional environment in which Montenegro's European orientation has repeatedly become the object of political confrontation. Rakipi does not entirely exclude another possible interpretation of what may have triggered concern in Podgorica. He says Montenegro could conceivably be referring to ideas or efforts emerging from Tirana and Belgrade advocating a different approach to regional integration. If such proposals were ever translated into a serious European policy, they could potentially slow Montenegro's accession, precisely because Montenegro is currently the most advanced candidate for EU membership. "It is not entirely impossible that Montenegro has in mind efforts or ideas coming from Tirana and Belgrade for a different approach to integration. Such proposals, if they ever materialised, which at present seems unlikely, could delay Montenegro's integration. Montenegro is currently the most likely candidate to join the European Union, although membership within this decade, by 2030, remains far from guaranteed," Rakipi said. But he draws a sharp line between disagreement over models of European integration and accusations of a coordinated campaign against Montenegro. "To claim, or even worse to accuse Albania of working together with Serbia and lobbying in Brussels and in EU member states against Montenegro sounds more like a conspiracy theory requiring a great deal of imagination than a realistic political scenario," Rakipi said. Montenegro's European future will in any event depend on much more than possible outside interference. Progress will ultimately be determined by the depth of reforms, the strengthening of the rule of law and the ability of state institutions to meet the conditions for membership. Podgorica also faces a series of unresolved issues with Croatia that could become increasingly important as accession negotiations move toward their final phase. The Albanian opposition has also treated the reports seriously. Democratic Party parliamentary group leader Gazment Bardhi said that Albania could not be part of any destabilizing scenario in the region and called on the government to seek formal clarification from Podgorica. He said that any cooperation between Albania and Serbia aimed at destabilizing Montenegro would amount to a diplomatic and political scandal of extraordinary proportions. For now, however, one fact should remain at the centre of the controversy: Spajić has spoken about two regional countries but has not publicly named Albania. Whether Podgorica possesses security information that directly implicates Albanian officials, whether the reference concerns broader political manoeuvring surrounding EU enlargement, or whether Albania has been drawn into what is essentially an internal Montenegrin political conflict remains unknown. The extraordinary meeting of Montenegro's Defence and Security Council may provide some of the answers. Until then, portraying Albania and Serbia as partners in a coordinated effort to destabilize Montenegro and sabotage its European future remains an extraordinary allegation in search of evidence. The post Montenegro Points to Albania and Serbia in Hybrid Threat Claim appeared first on Tirana Times .

Arrest Exposes Albania's Crime-Politics Nexus

Was a Key National Security Institution Penetrated by Organized Crime?

Tirana Times, August 28, 2026 – The arrest of businessman Ergys Agasi has put a new focus on allegations reaching beyond corruption in public procurement, raising broader questions about possible links between political power, business interests and organized crime - and about their alleged penetration of one of the Albanian state's most strategically sensitive institutions. Agasi, who had been wanted for months by Albania's Special Prosecution Against Corruption and Organized Crime, or SPAK, was arrested Aug. 26 in the coastal city of Durrës. Prosecutors accuse him and businessman Ermal Beqiraj of being central figures in a structured criminal group that allegedly manipulated contracts at the National Agency for Information Society, known by its Albanian acronym AKSHI. A notable detail surrounding the arrest has added another layer of interest to the case. At the time he was detained, Agasi was reportedly accompanied by a former senior Albanian police official who was serving as his driver. While that circumstance does not in itself establish wrongdoing on the part of the former official, it is likely to intensify scrutiny of Agasi's network of relationships, particularly given the broader allegations concerning his connections to influential figures in state institutions and political circles. But the significance of Agasi's arrest goes beyond the procurement case itself. For several years, Agasi has been portrayed in Albanian public debate as a businessman with unusual access to political power. Most notably, former Deputy Prime Minister Arben Ahmetaj has publicly accused him of acting as an intermediary between criminal groups and Prime Minister Edi Rama. Those claims have not been established by the AKSHI investigation and the material reviewed for this analysis does not contain evidence proving them. But Agasi's arrest on organized-crime charges has inevitably brought those earlier allegations back into focus. In an interview with Italy's RAI3 television, Ahmetaj went considerably further than alleging political connections. He described Agasi as a "coordinator" of criminal groups acting on behalf of Rama and alleged that figures linked to organized crime had access to the prime minister and government offices. Ahmetaj later questioned Agasi's presence alongside Rama during international travel, saying the businessman had accompanied the prime minister to the World Economic Forum in Davos and on a visit to the United Arab Emirates. The accusations are Ahmetaj's and remain separate from SPAK's criminal case. The material provided for this analysis does not include a response from Rama to those specific allegations. Still, the prosecution's case gives the controversy a new dimension because investigators are now formally accusing Agasi of involvement in organized criminal activity connected to a critical state institution. AKSHI is not an ordinary public agency. It manages key elements of Albania's digital state infrastructure, including the e-Albania platform through which citizens receive public services, as well as government systems that process sensitive information. Some procurement procedures handled by the institution are classified as state secret. That makes the investigation particularly sensitive. If SPAK's allegations are proven in court, the case would suggest that a network involving private businessmen, senior officials and individuals linked by prosecutors to organized crime was able to exercise influence over procurement inside an institution directly connected to the functioning and security of the Albanian state. SPAK has investigated 19 procurement procedures at AKSHI with a combined ceiling of about 5.9 billion lek, roughly 59 million euros. Prosecutors allege that contracts were manipulated by predetermining winning companies, inflating tender values and directing millions of euros toward businesses connected to Agasi and Beqiraj. The allegations describe methods that went far beyond favoritism or conventional corruption. According to prosecutors, competitors were subjected to pressure, threats and violence. Businesses challenging tender procedures were allegedly forced to withdraw complaints, and investigators have also included a case in which a businessman was allegedly deprived of his liberty and threatened in an effort to make him abandon a challenge to a tender. Agasi faces accusations including illegal competition through violence, unlawful deprivation of liberty, violating equality in public procurement, participation in a structured criminal group and money laundering. The investigation also extends to the highest levels of AKSHI. Former director Mirlinda Karçanaj and deputy director Hava Delibashi were placed under house arrest. Prosecutors allege that senior officials enabled the group to control procurement funds, predetermine winners and channel large amounts of public money toward companies linked to Agasi and Beqiraj. Such allegations carry particular weight because a number of the contracts were conducted under procedures classified as state secret. The combination of alleged organized-crime methods, senior officials and procurement inside an institution managing sensitive government infrastructure turns what might otherwise be treated as a corruption case into a wider question of institutional and national security. Agasi's public profile adds another layer to the case. Media reports cited in the material describe him as a businessman from Durrës involved in cigarette production and logistics and as a figure repeatedly discussed because of his alleged connections to criminal groups and his access to senior political circles. The circumstances of his arrest are also likely to attract further attention. His reported association at the moment of detention with a former senior police official serving as his driver may raise additional questions about the extent and character of the personal and institutional networks surrounding him. There is, however, no basis in the material reviewed here to conclude that the former police official was involved in the alleged AKSHI criminal scheme. The most serious political allegations have come from Ahmetaj, himself a former senior member of Rama's government. Speaking to RAI3, Ahmetaj alleged that criminal organizations had developed a system of coordination and explicitly named Agasi as the person who coordinated such groups on Rama's behalf. "Is Rama connected to these criminal groups?" Ahmetaj said in the interview before identifying Agasi as what he called their "coordinator." Ahmetaj also alleged that Agasi helped coordinate criminal groups for electoral purposes and claimed that figures from several parts of Albania had met Rama at government premises. Those claims have not been established in court and are not presented in the material as findings of SPAK. That distinction is critical. SPAK's case concerns alleged criminal activity surrounding AKSHI procurement. Ahmetaj's statements raise a much broader political accusation: that Agasi occupied a position at the intersection of government, business and organized crime. The available material does not establish that broader allegation as fact. But the arrest of Agasi on organized-crime charges means that the man at the center of those political accusations is now also a defendant in one of the country's most significant criminal investigations. The other principal businessman accused in the case, Ermal Beqiraj, was arrested in France on July 24 after flying a light aircraft into restricted airspace near the Penly nuclear power plant. SPAK said subsequent investigations by French authorities identified assets believed to have criminal origins. Prosecutors allege that Beqiraj transferred part of the illicit proceeds to France, purchasing a chateau, two apartments and vehicles and depositing more than 2 million euros in bank accounts. Albanian prosecutors have also sought the seizure of substantial assets linked to people and businesses under investigation. A first-instance special court approved seizures valued at more than 40 million euros, although the Special Court of Appeals later overturned part of SPAK's requests. Agasi was the last fugitive wanted in connection with the AKSHI case, according to reporting included in the material. His arrest therefore marks an important stage in the investigation. But the central questions now extend well beyond whether particular tenders were manipulated. The case will test prosecutors' ability to demonstrate how an alleged organized-crime network gained influence over procurement at an institution managing critical state systems; what role senior public officials played; and whether the network's influence extended beyond financial interests into Albania's political structures. It also puts renewed scrutiny on the earlier allegations about Agasi's relationship with political power - as well as on the wider network of relationships surrounding a businessman whom prosecutors now accuse of playing a central role in a structured criminal group. For prosecutors, the immediate task is to prove the criminal charges in court. For Albania's institutions, the larger issue is potentially more consequential: whether organized criminal interests were able to penetrate a body responsible for some of the state's most sensitive digital infrastructure - and, if so, how far that influence reached. The post Arrest Exposes Albania's Crime-Politics Nexus appeared first on Tirana Times .

Zelensky Visit to Belgrade: What Could He Learn from Israeli Experience
by Edward P. Joseph Tirana Times, August 21, 2026 – At the NATO Summit in Ankara last month, I had the high honor of meeting President Zelensky. Had I known he was heading soon to Belgrade, I would have shared critical advice with his advisors. Besieged by an aggressor like Russia - which has an active, global foreign policy and network of affiliates like Serbia - Ukraine must learn from the continuing controversy over Zelensky's Balkans visit. Without question, President Zelensky advanced Ukraine's interests by visiting the country that both Russia and China see as the core ally in the Balkans. The image of the Ukrainian and Serbian Presidents striding jointly down a red carpet before an honor guard surely doused morale in Moscow and stunned Beijing. Both capitals are acutely aware that Serbia - through lucrative arrangements with third-countries - supplies copious amounts of ammunition to Ukraine. In other words, after visiting Kyiv last month, President Aleksandar Vučić is now flaunting his relationship with Russia's arch enemy - whose forces use Serbian ammunition to kill invading Russian troops. And yet a weak, embattled President Putin can do little about it. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov admitted as much in his follow-up interview on 14 August. Having just responded to a question about "helping Ukrainians kill Russians", Lavrov stated that "it would be unacceptable if our Serbian brothers were to take part in arming the Kyiv regime." Yet the Kremlin has - to no avail - repeatedly assailed Serbia for knowingly selling "rockets and shells [that] ... kill Russian soldiers." Equally embarrassing, Moscow has pointed to Bulgaria as one of the conduits for Serbian ammunition. Lavrov hailed Prime Minister Rumen Radev as a leader (unlike Vučić) who "remains true to [his] principles and beliefs", even as Bulgarian officials openly state that (lucrative) arms sales to Ukraine will continue. Coming on the heels of a successful meeting with President Trump in Ankara, Zelensky's warm reception by Vučić sent a powerful message to Russia sympathizers in Serbia and around the region: it is Ukraine that is winning the war and Russia that is losing . From neighboring Bulgaria to Bosnia's Republika Sprska and Russia enthusiasts in Montenegro - those who cling to the notion that Russia will prevail over Ukraine suffered a serious setback. Radev's insistence that Ukraine's "cause is doomed " looks particularly dubious after the Zelensky visit to rival Serbia. The prospect of Serbian-Ukrainian cooperation in the energy sector could signal further movement by Belgrade away from its dependence on Russian fossil fuels. After dragging his feet for nearly a year on American demands to force out the Russian owners from NIS, the one-time Serbian state oil monopoly, Vučić may be moving to finally conclude a sale with neighboring Hungary. Unfortunately, what the visit will not do is force a strategic reassessment in Belgrade. Before the visit, Vučić made it clear that Serbia's firm position - refusing to implement EU sanctions on Russia - would not change. And why would Belgrade shift? Breaking with Russia, as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has demanded, would mean wholesale embrace of the EU - and rule of law reforms that a corrupt Serbian regime can never afford to make. To the contrary, the Zelensky visit is the boost that Vučić needed to maintain his phony 'balance' between Europe and the Serbian President's true kindred spirits in Russia and China. Among other things, this means that Russia Today and Sputnik will continue to spew pro-Russian propaganda around the region from their Serbian base - in open defiance of EU sanctions. Given that Kyiv knew in advance Belgrade's firm line on sanctions, the puzzle is why Zelensky rewarded his host with an exaggerated, inaccurate statement on Kosovo - alienating the staunchly pro-Ukraine Albanian polity and promoting Putin's core anti-NATO narrative. The Alliance's circumvention of Russia at the UN Security Council in 1999, and the US-led process that led to Kosovo's 2008 independence over Russian and Serbian objections are the touchstone events in the Russian President's anti-Western worldview. Putin has repeatedly asserted that the cases of Serbia and Ukraine are "absolutely the same ." Echoing this, Zelensky mistakenly conflated Ukraine's and Serbia's positions on international law in his public statement: "We respect the territorial integrity of our partners. We respect international law. That is our position. As for ... the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo ... Ukraine's policy has not changed." Lacking Balkans expertise on his team, Zelensky did not realize that in 2010, the International Court of Justice , in a case initiated by Serbia, declared that Kosovo's declaration of independence violated neither international law nor the governing UN Security Council resolution on the former Serbian province. Zelensky is not alone in his anxiety that Ukrainian recognition of Kosovo would enable Putin to use this as a 'precedent' justifying Russian recognition (and subsequent annexation) of Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea. But Putin already repeatedly - including in formal speeches before the Duma - has invoked 'the Kosovo precedent' as the excuse for Russian predations. Ironically, by pressing the false Serbia-Ukraine analogy, Zelensky encourages a tighter embrace between Belgrade and Moscow. Serbia depends on the Kremlin to block Kosovo's entry into the United Nations and other international organizations. The true parallel with Ukraine is Kosovo - a country subjugated for years by a far bigger and more powerful adversary until, belatedly, Western allies intervened. To pursue its interests in the Balkans, President Zelensky needs to combine pragmatic cooperation with Serbia with a principled and strategic grasp of the Kosovo standoff. It is Russia, not Ukraine, that needs to perpetuate the myth of NATO aggression leading to a transgression of international law. It is not too late to mitigate the error. Ukraine can emulate Israel which has managed to maintain close links with both Serbia - including as the recipient of Serbian ammunition - and Kosovo. Indeed, Kyiv can follow the precedent set by Moscow, which has had an official liaison office in Pristina throughout Kosovo's almost two decades of independence. And just as Presidents Zelensky and Vučić agreed to advance economic cooperation, so can Ukraine and Kosovo. Ultimately, as this author has written , Ukraine's interests lie in recognition of Kosovo - a step that will force the four NATO non-recognizers (Spain, Slovakia, Romania, and Greece) to reconsider their stubborn, legally-flawed positions. The Kyiv-Kosovo catalyst will open a NATO path for Kosovo, closing down Serbia's dependence on the Kremlin. Sticking to principle is, in the end, the most pragmatic course. The post Zelensky Visit to Belgrade: What Could He Learn from Israeli Experience appeared first on Tirana Times .

A Quarter Century Since Ohrid: The Agreement That Gave North Macedonia Its Future
by Ferit Hoxha , Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Albania Tirana Times, August 12, 2026 – There are moments in history when a country's future is shaped by a single document. Such agreements are rare, but their impact can endure for generations. The Ohrid Framework Agreement is one such example. On Aug. 13, 2001, 25 years ago, North Macedonia's political leaders, backed by the European Union and the United States, signed an agreement that would have a defining historical impact on the country and shape its trajectory for decades to come. The Ohrid Framework Agreement remains one of the region's most important political and diplomatic achievements in modern history. It showed that ethnic conflicts in the Balkans could be addressed not through force, but through dialogue, political compromise, respect for rights and the creation of institutions that ensure all citizens have an equal place in the state.With the region still bearing the scars of the Yugoslav wars, the Ohrid Agreement offered an alternative based on coexistence rather than division, compromise rather than victory for one side, and inclusion rather than exclusion, helping redefine how the state should function for all its citizens. The Ohrid Agreement represented, and continues to represent, a strategic commitment to peace, coexistence and the creation of a multi-ethnic state where differences are no longer a source of conflict, but part of a shared political and social framework. It gave North Macedonia the opportunity to break free from the legacy of conflict and build a more democratic, inclusive and stable state with a clear European path. Twenty-five years later, this remains Ohrid's most important legacy and the greatest responsibility of the current generation: to safeguard its achievements, carry its principles forward and ensure that peace, coexistence and the country's European orientation become irreversible. Albania has never viewed North Macedonia's stability and prosperity simply as the concern of another country. For us, they have always been directly linked to the stability and security of the Western Balkans. Good relations between communities, equality, respect for identity and language, fair representation and ensuring that every citizen feels fully part of the state are not merely matters of principle and fundamental rights. They are also essential to peace, security, stability and the region's European future. This was precisely the understanding that was reached and put into practice in Ohrid a quarter of a century ago. This is the most important lesson the Ohrid Agreement offers the region today. Peace is not secured simply by bringing a conflict to an end; it becomes sustainable when it is anchored in institutions, rights, equal opportunities and mutual trust. A peace agreement fulfils its purpose not merely when the guns fall silent, but when future generations no longer have reasons to turn back to conflict. By safeguarding the rights of communities, ensuring fairer representation in public administration and recognising the country's multi-ethnic character, the agreement established a new political and social balance. For this reason, the Ohrid Agreement should not be treated as something set in stone. It should instead be viewed as an enduring political commitment that requires constant attention, given its importance to North Macedonia's future and its role in shaping a democratic, multi-ethnic, inclusive and European state. Preserving the spirit of Ohrid does not mean dwelling on the memory of conflict, but ensuring that the grievances and conditions that fuelled it never again become a source of division. In this context, North Macedonia's NATO membership, genuine regional cooperation, good-neighbourly relations and European path are both a realisation and a natural continuation of the spirit of Ohrid. Europe does not seek to erase differences; rather, it calls for them to coexist within strong institutions, the rule of law and a democracy that guarantees equality and dignity for all. In the sphere of inter-ethnic relations, the Ohrid Agreement recognised a fundamental reality that was already clear in 2001: Albanians are an essential part of North Macedonia's society and a constituent community of the state.Their rights are not concessions bestowed by the majority, nor privileges that can be reconsidered according to the political climate of the day. They form part of the country's political compact and are among the foundations of a democratic and multi-ethnic state. Europe's strongest examples, along with the most positive experiences in our region, have shown that a state is stronger when it protects and guarantees the identity, language, culture and rights of its communities, both in law and in practice, in letter and in spirit. Similarly, communities that feel equal and properly represented are more likely to see the state as their own, contribute to its strength and invest in its future. In this sense, Ohrid did more than secure rights for Albanians. It reshaped the understanding of the state itself - not as a temporary balance between communities, but as a system where equality and state strength reinforce each other; where diversity is seen as part of a shared identity rather than a threat; and where ethnicity does not determine the rights or status of citizenship. On this anniversary, one lesson remains particularly relevant. The Ohrid Agreement reminds us that peace cannot be taken for granted. It must be preserved and nurtured through democratic institutions, respect for diversity and a shared vision for the future. For Albania, the stability, security and prosperity of North Macedonia are inseparable from the development and resilience of the region as a whole. Our two countries share not only a border, strategic interests and a path towards the European Union, but also the conviction that inter-ethnic relations based on respect and equality are the foundation on which modern European societies are built. Albania remains firmly convinced that lasting peace in the Balkans can be built by bringing people closer together, strengthening democratic institutions and bilateral and multilateral relations, respecting human rights, and giving all members of society, without distinction, a reason to see their future as part of the same shared project. Ohrid forged this path 25 years ago. It is the responsibility of today's generation to carry it forward.The anniversary is also a moment to take stock of the agreement's implementation, assess its effectiveness and consider what remains unfinished. Upholding the spirit of Ohrid is still an ongoing task: this year's debate over the use of Albanian in the justice system highlights that the rights secured in 2001 require continuous institutional attention and protection, rather than being confined to formal commemorations. North Macedonia today is not the same country it was 25 years ago. Its society has evolved, as have the region and Europe. The very concepts of security, sovereignty and cooperation have also undergone significant change. For this reason, Ohrid must also be understood in the context of this future. Preserving the Ohrid Agreement means continuing to build a state in which a return to confrontation and division becomes impossible. This requires responsibility from everyone, both social groups and political elites. As is expected of all countries in our region, we must recognise that the stability of one cannot be built on the insecurity of another. For Albania, its relationship with North Macedonia carries particular importance. We are neighbours, friends, NATO allies, partners in the European integration process and part of the same Balkan space, which knows the high cost of past conflicts but also the value of genuinely investing in a shared future. Albania will continue to support the rights of Albanians wherever they live, while also strongly supporting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and democratic functioning of the states in which they live.These two positions are not contradictory. On the contrary, they reflect the same principle: the rights of communities and the strength of the state are not mutually exclusive. Each reinforces the other. This is one of Ohrid's important lessons. Twenty-five years after it was signed, the Ohrid Framework Agreement remains foundational because it answered a fundamental question: can a common state be built in the Western Balkans while respecting different identities and making them part of its strength? The answer provided by the past 25 years of history is undoubtedly yes. That answer must be reaffirmed every day through trust and genuine investment in a future that moves the country forward. A quarter of a century later, perhaps the best way to honour the decision made on Aug. 13, 2001, and celebrate its achievements is not to view Ohrid simply as the agreement that ended conflict and division, but as the agreement that taught us all how to build lasting peace. The post A Quarter Century Since Ohrid: The Agreement That Gave North Macedonia Its Future appeared first on Tirana Times .

The Ibar River Should Carry Water, Not Nationalist Politics

Albania Serbia Diplomatic Clash Heats Up the Summer

By Albert Rakipi , PhD Tirana Times, August 12, 2026 – The latest dispute over the Ibar River shows how quickly a real security issue in the Western Balkans can be transformed into a contest of nationalist narratives. When Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić announced that experts were examining possible changes to the flow of the Ibar, linking the idea to the treatment of Serbs in Kosova, the issue immediately went beyond water management. The Ibar and the Ujman reservoir are vital to Kosova’s water supply, agriculture, industry and energy system. Any serious interference with this system would therefore have implications for national security, not simply hydrology. This is why Belgrade’s statement deserved a firm response. Water cannot become an instrument of political punishment. Yet the debate quickly moved elsewhere. What began as a question of water became a discussion about "Kosova and Metohija," "Greater Albania," Resolution 1244 and competing versions of history and sovereignty. This shift is politically convenient for Serbia because it obscures the central question: can an upstream intervention be treated as a purely domestic matter if it creates significant consequences downstream in Kosova? The answer is clearly no. International water principles rest on the recognition that rivers do not respect political narratives. Their management requires cooperation, consultation and prevention of significant cross border harm. Serbia is correct that Albania is not a riparian state on the Ibar. But this does not make a measure affecting Kosova a purely internal Serbian matter. Kosova’s initial response was therefore strategically sound. Pristina treated the issue primarily as one of water security, critical infrastructure, energy security and international norms rather than immediately entering a historical confrontation with Serbia. Facts, law and technical evidence provide a stronger case than nationalist rhetoric. The same lesson deserves attention in Tirana. Albania has every legitimate reason to support Kosova. Its security, international position and successful statehood are strategic interests for Albania and the region. But support should strengthen Kosova’s voice, not replace it. The rapid escalation of the Ibar dispute into a direct political exchange between Tirana and Belgrade created precisely the terrain on which Serbian diplomacy is most comfortable. The discussion moved from water security to "Greater Albania," territorial claims and historical grievances. That shift did not necessarily serve Kosova. There is a broader problem. Albanian foreign policy has periodically displayed what might be called a proxy foreign policy toward Kosova, using issues that fundamentally belong to Kosova and its institutions to project regional leadership, demonstrate usefulness to Western capitals and potentially convert that visibility into short term political capital at home. The problem begins when supporting Kosova becomes using Kosova. This tendency is not new. Tirana has sometimes behaved as though reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs were principally a matter between Albania and Serbia, when the real peace equation is between Kosova and Serbia. This has produced a paternalistic tendency to speak for Kosova, represent it or position Tirana as an intermediary in matters that belong first and foremost to Pristina. The episode of 2023 remains a striking example. At a sensitive moment in relations between Pristina and Belgrade, Prime Minister Edi Rama announced that he had sent French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz a draft statute for the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities in Kosova. Kosova’s own authorities had not seen the document before it was presented to the two European leaders. Whatever the merits of the proposal, advancing internationally a document touching Kosova’s constitutional order without prior consultation with Pristina illustrated precisely the problem. At times, Albania’s political establishment appears to forget a fundamental reality and behaves as though Kosova were an autonomous province of Albania rather than an independent state. It is not. The exceptionally close ties between Albania and Kosova make cooperation natural and indispensable. They do not give Tirana the right to substitute itself for Pristina. Indeed, a policy presented as support can, when taken too far, diminish Kosova’s own agency and create the impression that it requires representation from Albania. That runs against one of the most important political achievements of the past two decades: the consolidation of Kosova as an independent political subject, not as an appendage of Albania and not as an unresolved Albanian national question. The relationship between Tirana and Pristina is therefore strongest when it is understood as a relationship between two independent states with exceptionally close ties, not between a political center and a dependent periphery. The international response to the Ibar dispute was notably more restrained. The European Union returned the issue to the framework of normalization between Kosova and Serbia, Washington stressed that normalization is indispensable to peace and stability in the Western Balkans, and Germany likewise warned that statements about changing the Ibar’s course do not contribute to that objective. There is little evidence that the dispute itself points toward imminent conflict. It is instead another example of how unresolved relations between Kosova and Serbia can transform even technical questions into disputes over history, identity and sovereignty. The Ibar is a genuine issue of Kosova’s water and energy security. But the political confrontation surrounding it shows once again how easily nationalist narratives can overwhelm facts, law and political reality. The region has spent too much of its history turning geography into mythology. This time, the river should simply be allowed to carry water. The post The Ibar River Should Carry Water, Not Nationalist Politics appeared first on Tirana Times .

Vlora Airport Heads to Arbitration
Albania faces another potentially costly international dispute after losing several arbitration cases in recent years that have exposed the state to hundreds of millions of euros in compensation and related liabilities. Tirana Times, August 10, 2026 – Albania is no stranger to costly international arbitration. Over the past decade, the country has faced a series of disputes with foreign investors that have generated substantial liabilities for the state budget. Government data cited in an analysis of Finance Ministry records showed that by May 2022 Albania had recognized about 175.9 million euros in liabilities arising from 15 arbitration cases it had lost. One of the most prominent was the Hydro and others case involving Italian businessman Francesco Becchetti, in which an ICSID tribunal ordered Albania to pay about 99.5 million euros in damages, in addition to interest and millions more in legal and arbitration costs. That record gives the Vlora Airport dispute significance beyond the fate of a single infrastructure project. A new claim potentially running into hundreds of millions of euros would revive questions about how the Albanian state manages major concession contracts and why commercial disputes involving public institutions have repeatedly escalated into expensive international proceedings. Past arbitration cases have also shown that the financial consequences of such disputes can outlive the governments and officials involved in the original decisions. Ultimately, awards, legal costs and related liabilities are borne by the state budget and therefore by taxpayers. That concern is central to Pacolli's argument that MABCO sought for more than a year to avoid international arbitration before concluding that legal action outside Albania had become unavoidable. Past experience also makes MABCO's claimed exposure of around 320 million euros particularly sensitive. The figure does not mean that an arbitration tribunal would necessarily award that amount. Any eventual compensation would depend on jurisdiction, evidence, contractual obligations and the tribunal's assessment of damages. But even a fraction of such a claim could make the Vlora Airport case one of Albania's most consequential investor disputes. Past arbitration records provide an important warning against assuming that such claims are merely negotiating tactics. Albania has previously lost major international cases, and the Hydro case demonstrates that tribunals can impose substantial compensation when they conclude that state conduct violated protections afforded to an investor. The ICSID record confirms that the Hydro proceeding ended with an award against Albania and that the country's subsequent annulment effort was rejected. Kjo do ta forconte shumë edhe fundin e analizës. Unë do ta ndryshoja përfundimin në këtë formë: If MABCO files for arbitration, Albania will therefore enter the dispute carrying not only the arguments surrounding Vlora Airport but also the weight of its previous experience with costly international cases. The government can argue that the airport was not completed within the contractual deadline. MABCO will argue that state institutions prevented the majority investor from exercising control, failed to enforce judicial decisions effectively, blocked or tolerated restrictions on access to the construction site and then used the resulting delays to justify terminating the concession. The chronology presented by MABCO shows that it says it was deprived of effective control despite holding 98 percent of the shares, was unable to return fully to the site and repeatedly sought government intervention before penalties and termination procedures followed. That is why the coming dispute could become more than another arbitration over money. For Albania, it may become a test of whether the state can convince an international tribunal that its institutions acted consistently, impartially and in accordance with both the concession agreement and international investment protections. For foreign investors watching the case, the question will be broader: whether court decisions and contractual rights in Albania can be relied upon when a major investment becomes entangled in political, institutional and shareholder conflict. And for Albanian taxpayers, previous arbitration cases offer a more immediate warning. When governments lose international disputes, the financial consequences do not remain with the officials who made the decisions. They eventually become liabilities of the state. With MABCO speaking of an exposure of around 320 million euros, the Vlora Airport conflict could therefore become not only a battle over who was responsible for the failure to complete the airport, but potentially one of the most expensive tests yet of Albania's relationship with foreign investors. The post Vlora Airport Heads to Arbitration appeared first on Tirana Times .

Zelenskyy's Kosovo Stance Puts Solidarity With Ukraine to the Test
Pristina and Tirana push back against Kyiv's stance, insisting that Kosovo's sovereignty cannot be diminished or equated with Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Tirana Times , August 09, 2026 – Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's confirmation in Belgrade that Kyiv has not changed its position on Kosovo has triggered criticism in Albania and Kosovo, exposing a growing tension between moral solidarity with Ukraine and the political realities facing small states in the Balkans. Speaking at a joint news conference with Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, Zelenskyy said Ukraine continued to respect what it considers the territorial integrity of its partners. He thanked Serbia for supporting Ukraine's territorial integrity, including Crimea, and said Kyiv's position on Kosovo remained unchanged. The statement did not represent a new Ukrainian policy. Ukraine has not recognized Kosovo since it declared independence in 2008. Its political impact, however, was amplified by the location and timing. Zelenskyy delivered the message in Belgrade, standing beside a Serbian president whose government continues to oppose Kosovo's independence and campaigns against its international recognition. The first formal response in Pristina came from Kosovo's acting foreign minister, Glauk Konjufca, who expressed regret over Zelenskyy's reaffirmation of Ukraine's refusal to recognize Kosovo and placed Kyiv's position against Kosovo's record of support since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion. "We note with regret President Zelenskyy's statements in Belgrade, where he reaffirmed Ukraine's non-recognition of the Republic of Kosovo. From the first day of Russia's full-scale aggression, Kosovo has stood unequivocally with Ukraine. We condemned the invasion, fully aligned with the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, imposed sanctions on Russia and Belarus, provided humanitarian assistance and shelter for Ukrainian journalists, and contributed aid and military training in support of Ukraine's defense. We did so despite Ukraine's non-recognition of our state, because solidarity with a people defending its freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity is a matter of principle," Konjufca wrote on X. Konjufca said Kosovo was a sovereign and independent state born from its people's struggle for freedom and from its liberation in 1999, after years of systematic repression and what he called the genocidal campaign of the Milosevic regime. "What followed was not an act of annexation, invasion or territorial occupation, but a comprehensive international process under United Nations administration and years of internationally mediated negotiations on Kosovo's final status. When those negotiations had exhausted every possibility for a solution accepted by both sides, the United Nations special envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, recommended independence as Kosovo's final status and presented a comprehensive framework for the new state, including some of the broadest constitutional guarantees in Europe for non-majority communities," he said. Konjufca's intervention gave the dispute an official diplomatic dimension. The reaction in Pristina was also immediate and highly symbolic: municipal authorities removed a large Ukrainian flag and the "Free Ukraine" banner that had been displayed in the center of the capital for about four years. Pristina Mayor Perparim Rama announced the decision on social media, saying Kosovo's statehood must be respected.

"When Kosovo is not respected, the capital Pristina always responds in the same way," Rama said. He stressed that the city's empathy and solidarity would remain with people facing war, violence and persecution. But he added that no cause or foreign policy could be built by diminishing Kosovo's statehood or the sacrifices made by its people. The removal of the banner did not amount to a change in Kosovo's broader support for the Ukrainian people. It was instead a public expression of frustration with what many in Kosovo see as a lack of political reciprocity from Kyiv. Konjufca's account reflected Kosovo's broader alignment with the United States and the European Union since Russia launched its full invasion of Ukraine. That support continued even though Kyiv withheld recognition of Kosovo. The Albanian government offered a more diplomatic but equally firm response. Albania's Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs welcomed dialogue between Ukraine and Serbia but rejected any comparison between Kosovo's independence and Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The ministry said Albania would continue to stand firmly behind Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and European future. At the same time, it said Albania would defend Kosovo's sovereignty, independence and rightful place in the Euro Atlantic community. According to the ministry, attempts to establish an equivalence between Kosovo and other international disputes are wrong and politically misleading. It cited the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which found that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law. The ministry argued that Russia's invasion of Ukraine was fundamentally different because it represented a violation of the United Nations Charter and of the international legal order. It also described Kosovo's independence as an irreversible political reality and said lasting stability in the Western Balkans required its acceptance. Normalization between Kosovo and Serbia, the ministry said, should ultimately lead to mutual recognition and a shared European future. At the same time, Tirana acknowledged that Zelenskyy's visit to Serbia primarily served Ukraine's national interests. Albania said any step that encouraged Serbia to distance itself from Russian influence and move closer to Europe should be viewed positively. But it also warned that engagement with Belgrade should not come at the expense of Kosovo's international position. Albert Rakipi, a former Albanian deputy foreign minister and chairman of the Albanian Institute for International Studies, said Zelenskyy's position revealed the limits of symbolic solidarity in international relations. Rakipi argued that Kosovo's statehood should not be treated as a political choice between Belgrade and Pristina. "That is a false equation," he said. He noted that Zelenskyy had built much of his international moral authority by rejecting political realities imposed by stronger powers and by defending the right of a nation to sovereignty, freedom and political existence. For that reason, Rakipi said, Ukraine's position on Kosovo deserved particular scrutiny. Kyiv appeared willing to accept what he described as a political fiction that conflicted with the reality created in Kosovo over more than two decades. Rakipi said the large Ukrainian banners in Pristina and the grand summits organized in Tirana may havedemonstrated solidarity with Ukraine. But he added that solidarity could not replace strategic clarity or political realism. For small states, he said, realism did not necessarily mean cynicism or the abandonment of principles. It meant understanding that recognition, political support and reciprocity could not be assumed. "For small states, realism is ultimately a form of self preservation," Rakipi said. Kosovo analyst Agon Maliqi directed much of his criticism toward Kosovo's own foreign policy and political leadership. Maliqi argued that the period after the start of the war, when Ukraine was more dependent on the United States and the administration of President Joe Biden, may have offered Kosovo a stronger opportunity to seek a change in Kyiv's position. According to Maliqi, Kosovo failed to invest enough political capital in building a direct and sustained relationship with Ukraine. He said relations could also have been developed through Albania, Turkey, Britain and other partners with influence in Kyiv. Meanwhile, Serbia had used military supplies, technical assistance and political engagement to improve its standing with Ukraine and Western governments. Maliqi argued that Belgrade had successfully used this cooperation to strengthen its position and limit Kosovo's access to Ukrainian decision makers. He also criticized Kosovo's confrontational approach toward some of its allies, saying friendly states would have little incentive to invest political energy in helping Kosovo if its own leadership appeared uninterested in sustained diplomatic coordination. His argument shifted part of the responsibility from Ukraine to Kosovo itself. While Zelenskyy's statement was disappointing, Maliqi suggested it was also the predictable result of a foreign policy that relied too heavily on public declarations of solidarity and not enough on patient diplomatic engagement. Konjufca's statement became the most senior formal response from Kosovo's government, while the removal of the banner remained the most visible public gesture. Together, the two reactions combined an official defense of Kosovo's statehood with a symbolic expression of frustration over the lack of reciprocity from Kyiv. The controversy highlights the different calculations driving Ukraine, Serbia, Kosovo and Albania. Ukraine needs diplomatic support, military supplies, reconstruction partners and wider international engagement. Serbia offers Kyiv practical cooperation while continuing to maintain relations with Russia. For Zelenskyy, improving ties with Belgrade may serve the immediate interests of a country at war. For Serbia, the visit offered international legitimacy and allowed Vucic to reinforce the argument that support for Ukraine's territorial integrity should be matched by Ukraine's continued refusal to recognize Kosovo. For Kosovo, the episode demonstrated that shared experiences of war and occupation do not automatically produce shared diplomatic positions. Kosovo's political and public support for Ukraine has not yet translated into Ukrainian recognition. Albania attempted to balance two principles. It defended Ukraine against Russian aggression while insisting that Kosovo's independence could not be treated as comparable to territorial conquest or foreign occupation. The removal of the Ukrainian banner in Pristina was therefore more than a municipal gesture. It reflected a wider reassessment of how small states should distribute solidarity, political capital and diplomatic support. Sympathy for the Ukrainian people is likely to remain strong in both Albania and Kosovo. But Zelenskyy's statement has made clear that solidarity without recognition can become politically difficult to sustain, particularly when it appears to benefit a regional rival that has invested more effectively in its diplomatic relationship with Kyiv. The post Zelenskyy's Kosovo Stance Puts Solidarity With Ukraine to the Test appeared first on Tirana Times .

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